At this point in the season, it is painfully obvious that the Nationals will not be in contention for a postseason appearance come September.  The Nationals’ near-.500 record, especially their peak record of 20-15 on May 13, gave Nationals fans illusions of grandeur.  Realistically, the team should not win more than 75 games.  Keeping this harsh reality in mind, it will be fun to see how Mike Rizzo and company react between now and July 31.

Upon reading Harper’s take over at <a href=”http://natsbaseball.blogspot.com/2010/06/deal.html”>Nationals Baseball</a>, I became intrigued by some of his suggestions.  I agreed with some of the things he said, but others flat out confused me.  I guess the point of blogs, though, is to created discussion.

Harper’s first idea involves trading “‘garbage’ for whatever we can get.  They want Willie Harris, Alberto Gonzalez, Tyler Walker, Sean Burnett for a low A-ball ‘prospect?’  Fine.  Do it.”  Now I understand that every one of these guys is expendable, but can they all be easily replaced?  I am sure the team would have no problem using Jesse English and Joel Peralta in the bullpen for the rest of the year.  And Willie Harris definitely deserves to play for a team on which he will get more playing time.  Alberto Gonzalez, though, is under team control for 4 more years after 2010.  He plays good defense (despite large yearly fluctuations in UZR) and has become a decent pinch hitter.  Gonzalez is not the second coming of Alex Rodriguez, but he is by no means “garbage” who should be tossed out for a player with a marginal chance of making the major leagues.

I can more easily get behind the idea of trading Matt Capps.  There is a plethora of teams that could use bullpen help, like the Angels, Reds, and Marlins.  Each of those teams likely believes it has a chance of playing in the postseason and would give up some sort of prospect for a hot closer.  On the other hand, Capps is only 26 and is not eligible for free agency until after the 2011 season.  Given how bad the bullpen performed last year, is it smart to give up cheap, proven commodities?  Then again, the Pirates were dumb enough to non-tender Capps.  It is always possible that another team will make a similar mistake on which the Nationals could pounce.  Or, given the versatile nature of relievers, maybe Joel Peralta will have a big season in 2011.  My conclusion:  trade Capps at the deadline and promote Drew Storen to a higher role in the bullpen.

As Harper states, it becomes fishy after that (among fans).  Should the Nationals trade Adam Dunn and Josh Willingham?  I do not know if there is a definitive answer to that question.  It really depends on whether Rizzo sees these two players as part of the long-term team.  Willingham is 31 and Dunn is 30, both past their prime.  If a team desperately needs a bat down the stretch, both of these players could be valued highly on the trade market.  Willingham is obviously having a career year offensively while Dunn has been putting the ball in play more than ever (granted, at the cost of walks instead of strikeouts).  The only way the Nationals could trade Dunn is if they have a backup plan in place.  I do not mean simply for this year but for the next three or four years.  Whether that is Chris Marrero or Bryce Harper, there has to be some sort of arrangement at first base.

Outside of these few players, the Nationals do not have many tradable commodities.  Maybe Rizzo can sucker some team into taking Nyjer Morgan or Miguel Batista.  The best case scenario is one in which some team forks over a decent prospect for Livan Hernandez, but I don’t foresee that happening.

Imagine for one second that the Nationals had a legitimate leadoff hitter.  Instead of with two outs and nobody on, Ryan Zimmerman steps into the batters box with a runner on second base and one out.  Since this is our imagination, allow us to be even more optimistic.  Zimmerman steps into the box and there are two men on and nobody out.  What a turnaround.

There is an explanation for having taken you through this exercise, and I am certain you have figured it out.  Right now, it seems like the Nationals do not have any serious candidates to fill the holes atop their batting order.  Day-after-day, manager Jim Riggleman sketches the names “Morgan” and “Guzman” or “Guzman” and “Morgan” on the top of his lineup card.  I am really not sure why he continues to do this, but maybe someone can fill me in.

What I know, and Riggleman must know as well, is that Cristian Guzman’s on-base percentage in 2010 is .325, or 5 points below the National League average.  Nyjer Morgan’s OBP is .314.  Considering what kind of production the Nationals have received from these two spots this year (.253/.315/.341 and .274/.330/.365), league average would be an absolute upgrade.

There is a logical reason why these two places in the batting order are so important.  Most people know this already.  Broadcasters refer to these players as “table-setters.”  These players are faced with task of getting on base, getting into scoring position, and scoring when the proceeding batters drive them in.  Somewhere along the line speed became a necessity for these two spots in the batting order.  It’s sad, really, because if the batter cannot get on base, his speed won’t help him at all.  This, by the way, is the reason why Usain Bolt does not play baseball.  He could sprint around the bases all he wants, but that does not qualify him as a good hitter.

There is a chain effect that occurs by putting betters hitters at the top of the batting order.  Not only do they get more plate appearances, but worse hitters get fewer plate appearances.  And why not?  Until a player proves he can hit, why should he be given more opportunities than someone who has proven he can hit?  And why should that player be placed into a more premium spot in the lineup?  I often wonder if Riggleman asks these questions when filling out his lineup card.

The Nationals currently rank 10^th in the National League with 283 runs scored.  That number could be much higher if the Nationals fielded a competent batting order.  The question is, how would one go about making the Nationals batting order proficient?  Undoubtedly, the most important statistic for a leadoff hitter is on-base percentage.  Regardless of how powerful or speedy the batter is, his goal is to get on base.  It does not matter what base he reaches or where he ends up when the second batter approaches home plate.  What matters is that he reached base, or, to put it another way, did not make an out.  Quite simply, making outs advances the game more quickly and allows the team fewer opportunities to score runs.

Let’s take a look at the on-base percentages of Nationals’ players with at least 100 plate appearances in 2010.

As of 6/16/2010 5:00 pm ET:

Of course, on-base percentage is not the only criterion to be a successful leadoff hitter.  I said before that it does not matter which base the batters reaches as long as he gets to one.  This is true, but it is also true that reaching a further base is more beneficial than reaching first base.*  Thus, the next aspect I would like to measure is power, and I will do this using the isolated power statistic (ISO).  ISO is simply slugging percentage minus batting average.  Let’s look at this simple derivation of the formula:

Given:  BA = H/AB; SLG = TB/AB; TB = 1B + 2B*2 + 3B*3 + HR*4

ISO = SLG – BA

= TB/AB – H/AB

= (TB – H) / AB

In other words, ISO measures how many extra bases a batter produces per at-bat.  For example, if a batter has a .250 batting average and a .520 slugging percentage, then his ISO is .270.  That batter produces an extra .270 bases every time he steps up to bat.  Why is this important when we already have slugging percentage?  Essentially, it takes the weight off of singles.  This is not a dismissing of singles as positive contributions but rather as a result of good power.  If batters needed much power to hit a single, Juan Pierre would never have even dreamed of a .300 batting average.

Here are the isolated power numbers of Nationals players in 2010 (min. 100 PA):

As of 6/16/2010 5:00 pm ET:

Unsurprisingly, Adam Dunn tops the list.  Dunn is a man-beast who hits the ball harder than almost any other baseball player.  What is surprising is the bottom of the list.  The very bottom of the list.  Indeed, Cristian Guzman has hit for less power this year than Wil Nieves.  Keep in mind, it is a measly 1 point, or .001 extra bases per at bat differences between the two players.  Still, the point is clear:  Cristian Guzman just does not have enough power to hit near the top of the order.

What else must a good leadoff hitter do?  Well, if he gets on base, he has certainly done his job.  However, it is definitely an added bonus if the first hitter of the game sees many pitches.  Doing so allows subsequent batters to see what the pitcher is throwing and the umpire’s strike zone, among other things.  The following table shows each batter’s amount of pitchers per plate appearances, percentage of swings on pitches out of the strike zone, and percentage of times the batter makes contact on pitches out of the zone:

As of 6/17/2010 4:55 pm ET:

Again, to no one’s amazement, Josh Willingham tops the list.  Fittingly, he also leads the team in on-base percentage.  He also swings at the least pitches out of the strike zone but makes contact a decent amount of the time (1.3% below league average) when he does.  My intention is not to beat a dead horse, but, as usual, Cristian Guzman appears near the bottom of the list.  He also swings at more pitches out of the zone than anyone on the team besides the catchers.  This approach will prove to be unsuccessful – and already has been – over the course of the year.

The intention of this article is not to create some super statistic called “Leadoff Index” or xBAT1 or some crazy name.  My goal is to bring attention to the fact that Nyjer Morgan and Cristian Guzman have been two of the least successful hitters in the Nationals’ daily starting lineup, yet they are both consistently placed in premium positions in the batting order.  Somewhere along the line, something has to change.  I say “something” instead of “this” because there is one possibility that I have not mentioned.  Measuring how many pitches a batter sees per plate appearances is part of his tendencies and will not change.  In other words, Cristian Guzman will not begin to take more pitches out of the blue.  However, Guzman may begin to hit the ball a bit harder, and he may have another red hot month like May.  The odds of this are unlikely because, quite frankly, Guzman is not a very good batter.  He is, essentially, an efficient out machine.  Getting Guzman out three times is similar to pitching a 10-pitch inning.

I will conclude what I started with an unsatisfying answer:  there is no permanent solution for the leadoff role.  Not yet, anyway.  What I mean is that any hitter could have a hot streak and any player could go cold at any time.  That is the very essence of baseball.  Guzman was the very best candidate for the leadoff job during May, a month in which he hit .381/.411/.452.  So far in June, he has posted a .237 on-base percentage.  On the other hand, Roger Bernadina is hitting .366/.469/.561 in June after having posted a .250/.284/.434 line in May.  Thus, I believe that the leadoff role should be reserved for whoever has a hot bat.  Some readers may argue that certain players prefer to hit in certain spots in the batting order.  Many players claim that they do not like leading off.  What do they do when they are due to lead off an inning?  These excuses are almost as absurd as a closer who cannot pitch unless his team is winning by three or less runs in the 9^th inning (it sounds ridiculous when you spell it out, doesn’t it?).

Right now, Bernadina should get as many plate appearances as possible.  He has been getting on base, hitting for power, and stealing bases this month.  Maybe in a week, Nyjer Morgan will have caught fire.  Maybe he will once again become the catalyst that the Nationals thought they were getting when they traded for him last July.  The important thing is to not wait for him to become hot.  All that accomplishes is hurting the team.

Lastly, I want to point out an interesting stat line.  Nyjer Morgan is batting .340/.397/.509 in first innings this year.  In the following innings, he is batting only .223/.286/.280.  Yes, that is horrible.  It is intriguing that in the first inning, Morgan seems to be acting like the spark the team expects.  Yet, after that, he is almost completely useless.  I have attempted to create an explanation, but I cannot think of one.  I would really like to know why Morgan cannot hit after the first inning.  It should still be noted that the leadoff hitter gets more plate appearances than any other batter, and the ensuing plate appearances that Morgan gets after the first inning are essentially free outs.

*Quick side note:  it could be argued that a leadoff walk is more advantageous than a leadoff single or even a double.  I don’t have access to the proper data to research the value of a leadoff walk compared to a walk with one or two outs, but I think it might be worth studying.

Stephen Strasburg was definitely impressive on Tuesday night. From the moment he signed his contract on August 17, 2009, fans of baseball have been awaiting the phenom’s debut. At 7:05, Strasburg finally delivered his first major league pitch: a 97 mile per hour fastball, inside to Andrew McCutchen. The crowd booed. They’ll learn. Not every pitch that Strasburg throws is a strike.

I would like to take a second to discuss my favorite part of the night. In the top of the third inning, Jason Jaramillo led off the third inning by staring helplessly at four pitches. The final pitch, an 83 mile per hour curveball, belt high on the outside half of the plate, was responded to by a Tom Hallion jab behind home plate that would have made Muhammad Ali proud.

Strasburg’s final line: 7 innings pitched, 4 hits, 2 runs, 14 strikeouts, 1 hr; 18 swings and misses, 94 pitches

Talk about composure. A rookie making his major league debut and he walks not one batter? Upon giving up a home run to Delwyn Young in the 4th inning, Strasburg retired the next 10 batters, 8 by strike out. And just like that, after 7 brilliant innings, his night was over. He had done his job, handed the ball over to the generally trustworthy tandem of Tyler Clippard and Matt Capps, and that was that. Almost like clockwork, “Clipp n’ Save” teamed up for 2 innings of work, allowing 1 hit while striking out three batters. That ended a night in which the Nationals pitching staff struck out 17 batters and walked none. As far as those batters who were lucky enough to put a ball in play, 5 of them reached base, including the home run, 7 of them grounded out, and 2 of them flied out.

Not to be lost in the fantastic pitching performances is the combination of Ryan Zimmerman, Adam Dunn, and Josh Willingham, who combined were 7-for-11, 3 home runs, 4 runs batted in, and 5 runs scored.

There is a lot to be excited about if you are a Nationals fan – and even a baseball fan in general – about this Washington Nationals team. Strasburg’s next start is scheduled for Sunday, but let’s not get too far ahead of ourselves. Tomorrow night, the Nationals will try to win their first series in over a week. Livan Hernandez John Lannan, who gets batters out with a slightly different technique than Strasburg, will be on the hill.

Update: I apologize for the error. As of last night, MLB.com still had Hernandez scheduled to start tonight’s game. It is actually John Lannan.

Thursday’s 6-4 loss to the Houston Astros was the second heartbreaking loss in three days. The Nationals are now 26-29 through 55 games, which is still better than many baseball speculators predicted at the beginning of the year. Losing 3 of 4 games to the Astros certainly does hurt, but the Nationals should have come out of the series having learned a few lessons.

First and foremost is that teams cannot stick anyone in the outfield. This isn’t little league baseball in which the hitters barely hit the ball out of the infield. This holds especially true in right field, to which most in-play fly balls are hit. Jim Riggleman incorrectly believes that Cristian Guzman’s speed can make up for his lack of experience playing outfield. There is a clear distinction between outfielders and infielders, and there is a reason for that. Outfielders play in the outfield every day and gain experience that other players do not have. For example, playing sinking line drives. Lance Berkman’s line drive in the 9th inning may have been a hard play for even the best outfielder in baseball, but I am certain that a true outfielder would have caught the ball.

It’s time for Riggleman to pull the plug on the Guzman in right field experiment. It has thus far failed. His bat is not good enough to put a defensive liability in the field. Guzman sports a .321 wOBA, backed by a .316/.341/.397 slash line. There is simply no reason to hurt the team’s defense in order to get his mediocre bat in the lineup. Guzman has played short stop his entire professional career. He belongs in the infield or on the bench.

Secondly, the team should not underestimate Ivan Rodriguez’s value. Besides the tangible batting statistics quickly show Pudge’s early season hitting prowess, he has 20 years of experience in the Major Leagues. By all means, Wil Nieves has been serviceable behind the plate, as the team has averaged only 3.91 runs against per game when he catches. However, it is impossible to numerically measure the impact that Rodriguez has on pitchers, both young and old.

Lesson number three refers again to the right field situation. Roger Bernadina is not the right fielder of the future for the Nationals. Neither is Justin Maxwell or Willie Harris or Cristian Guzman or Mike Morse. Bernadina reached base four times during the Nationals 10-game road trip. He currently is hitting .244 with a .696 OPS. It’s possible that Bernadina is going through a slump and the small amount of plate appearances affects his numbers greatly. However, watching Bernadina attempt to pull every breaking ball on the outer half of the plate is growing tiresome. If the Nationals are serious about contending this year, which is beginning to feel like a pipe dream, the team will need to find a plausible right field solution.

Four of the next six series come against teams with records under .500. The rest of June could very well determine whether or not the Nationals are a serious contender for the 2010 postseason.

As a fan of one particular team, it is often hard to stay level-headed. It can be difficult to remain objective when discussing a particular series of events. Last night’s 8-7 loss is one of them. The game featured one poor pitching performance from Craig Stammen and one very strong performance by Brett Myers, which were both overshadowed by an eventful 9th inning. The Nationals were down 6-5 to begin the inning with Matt Lindstrom set to pitch. Lindstrom has pitched very well in 2009 with a 3.72 xFIP, 2.82 ERA, and, entering the game, 11-for-12 in save opportunities. Still, with Nyjer Morgan, Ryan Zimmerman, and Adam Dunn due up, Nationals fans must have had a glimmer of hope. The three hitters each reached base and the Nationals scored two runs to take the lead.

Enter Matt Capps. He leads the National League in saves, and even after blowing his second save of the season last night, has still done a fantastic job of closing out Nationals’ wins (17/19, 89.5%).

The events that led to Lance Berkman’s game-winning hit are disappointing but nothing worth complaining about. Errors happen; and the Nationals are fortunate that Cory Sullivan’s double did not leave the park. What I am upset about is how Capps approached the last at-bat against Berkman.

First, I want to issue a disclaimer. I am not an expert on pitching, and I have never claimed to be. I am just expressing my opinion. Baseball would not be fun to watch without our ability to do so. A fellow writer criticized my comments. I would love to hear everyone’s opinion on the matter in the comments section here.

Capps quickly got ahead of Berkman 0-2 with two sliders. I quickly told my father, and fellow Nationals fan, that Capps should throw a high fastball to setup a slider in the dirt. The fastball, of course, should not be anywhere near the strike zone. The 0-2 pitch was a fastball, head-high. Perfect. The 1-2 pitch, however, was another fastball, barely above the belt, and Berkman just missed it. He fouled it off, giving himself another life. Capps threw yet another fastball, just off the plate outside, at which Berkman checked his swing. Whether or not he swung is questionable, but Bill Hohn, the third base umpire, said he did not.

What proceeded is possible stubbornness, bad game-calling, or something of the sort. Maybe Capps didn’t like his slider last night. However, evidence points to the fact that Capps should not have thrown four straight fastballs to the all-star first baseman.

First of all, Berkman has not hit sliders well this year. He has produced -3.76 runs per 100 sliders compared to 0.90 per 100 fastballs. Throughout his career, Berkman has hit fastballs better than sliders. Secondly, Berkman has been swinging at pitches out of the zone at similar rates to those of his career, but he is making much less contact. The situation called for an offspeed pitch out of the zone.

I am playing a what-if game here, but I played it before Berkman hit a single. Had Berkman swung and missed the pitch or hit the ball to a player somewhere, I would have been happy with the result. However, I still would have believed a slider was the right pitch to throw. Had he thrown the slider and Berkman got a hit that won the game, I would have been upset, but I still would have believed it was the right pitch to throw. I am not second-guessing Capps’ decision. I first-guessed it before it happened.

If you have any thoughts on the situation, I would love to hear them.

It’s easy and quite cliché to second guess a manager after a loss, so I plan on doing it anyway. My dad and I were in attendance for last night’s game at CitiField. Upon being given a 3-run lead in the top of the first inning, I told my dad that I thought the game was pretty much wrapped up. A veteran pitcher like Scott Olsen should be able to hold the Mets offense to less than three runs. To Olsen’s credit, he pretty much did his job. He did not quite make it through 6 innings, but Tyler Walker relieved him and escaped danger by retiring the two batters he faced. After a quick top of the 7th inning, Walker returned to the mound, poised to begin his second inning of work. With a 6-2 lead, it seemed like a good time to give overworked relievers Tyler Clippard and Matt Capps the night off. Instead, Riggleman proceeded to over-manage the situation, something he does quite often.

Alex Cora, a weak, left-handed hitting middle infielder led off the bottom of the 7th inning pinch hitting for the Mets’ pitcher, Hisanori Takahashi. In case you are wondering, because I certainly was, Alex Cora has a .656 career OPS. Cora has actually hit better against left-handed pitchers than right-handed pitchers throughout his career (.701 OPS, .313 wOBA vs. righties, .672 OPS, .298 wOBA vs. lefties). Instead of using facts to support his decision, Riggleman went by the book. Lefty-lefty matchup. In jogged left-hander Doug Slaten from the bullpen. Slaten walked Cora, and then gave up a single to switch-hitting outfielder Angel Pagan. Only the help of a double play allowed Slaten to escape unscathed.

Why is this significant, you ask? After all, he did not give up any runs and got the Nationals three outs closer to their 19th win of the season. This is why the move was significant: Riggleman wasted a relief pitcher. Instead of allowing Walker to pitch another inning, he brought in Slaten. Essentially, the move forced Riggleman to have to use Brian Bruney and Miguel Batista.

The poor managing did not end there. This move I truly do not understand. Just days after Riggleman told the media that Clippard and Capps are being overused, it seemed as though Riggleman had decided to give them the day off. Brian Bruney started the 8th inning by facing three batters and letting all three reach base (with the help of an Ian Desmond error). With the score 6-3, Riggleman brought in Tyler Clippard. I am still confused by this move. Is a four-run lead really that much better than three? A 6-3 lead is close enough to use Clippard but not 6-2? If Clippard was available last night, he should have started the 8th inning. If he was unavailable, he should not have pitched at all. There is absolutely no logical reason why he did not start the inning but was able to pitch after the team ran into trouble. The only possibility I can think of is that a four-run lead is not a save situation, so, naturally, a setup man or closer should not pitch. What a load of crap.

Take my rant with a grain of salt. There is no way of knowing that Tyler Walker would have pitched a scoreless 7th inning. There is really no way of knowing how all of the events would have played out. What we do all know is that what Riggleman did last night was flat out wrong. He hurt his team’s chances of winning.

There are two games that come close to how bad the Nationals played last night. The first is the home opener, an 11-1 loss to the Phillies. The low quality of play combined with Phillies fans overtaking Nationals Park and acting extremely rudely (not to generalize, but I have yet to hear anything good about the Phillies fans who came to Washington that day) make a very close second. The third is the April 18 loss to the Brewers, in which Jason Marquis pitched to seven batters, all of whom scored. What salvages that game is that the Nationals never gave up. Down 10-0 in the first inning, they battled back, outscoring the Brewers 7-1 from that point on. A loss is a loss, but when the team battles and fights, you can’t hold anything against them.

Last night, the Nationals played their worst game of the 2010 season. What places this game ahead of the Opening Day loss is that there was no hope coming into the year. Any rational fan thought the Nationals were going to come out of the gate walking, possibly backwards, on their way to another 90-loss season. Now that the Nationals have an identity, that of a gritty team that never gives up and always fights back, and are playing above-.500 baseball, following a game like the one that took place last night is simply painful.

The team made two fielding errors according to the official scorer, but there could have been more. The first one occurred in the 4th inning when Nyjer Morgan caught a flyball with a man on third. The runner was not tagging up. Morgan came up throwing and not only did not hit his cutoff man but overthrew Ivan Rodriguez at the plate. The throw hit the backstop on a fly. A heads up Cody Ross scampered home from third base and scored, despite a collision at the plate. In the next inning, Craig Stammen’s pickoff attempt went into centerfield, allowing the runner to advance to third base. After walking the batter, he was relieved by Tyler Walker. Walker picked Chris Coghlan off first base, struck out Hanley Ramirez, and then gave up a 2-run home run to Jorge Cantu.

Aside from shaky pitching and defense, the Nationals also had many uninspired at-bats. From the 6th inning on the Nationals saw 50 pitches. Of the 14 at-bats that occurred, 9 of them ended after 4 pitches or fewer. Some credit must be given to Chris Volstad, who, by all means, pitched a very solid game. Between the 6th and 8th innings, Volstad threw 7 first-pitch strikes in 10 at-bats and allowed only one batter to reach base. By the 9th inning, it seemed like fatigue had begun to take its place. Volstad faced 4 batters, three only 1 first-pitch strike, and gave up two hits. Fortunately for him, the Nationals no longer cared about the game. Nyjer Morgan, who, for the most part, is pretty good and working deep into counts (which should be a given for any leadoff hitter), took ball one and then grounded out on the next pitch. Adam Kennedy looked at three pitches before singling and was thrown out trying to stretch his hit into a double. In a 7-1 game, could he have done anything more stupid? I suppose he could have tried to pull a low and outside, 1-0 change up…but I digress.

I began writing this post at 11:00 am (I got sidetracked). It’s now 4:58 pm and the Nationals have lost their second game in a row. It seems to have been another spiritless effort, though, I was unable to follow this game because I was busy watching the Canadiens win Game 2 against the Penguins. Anyhow, tomorrow is an off-day, meaning the Nationals can regroup. The bullpen will be rested, the offense will be fresh, and Livan will be pitching on Tuesday night when the Nationals take on the Braves.

One more quick tidbit: Stephen Strasburg is expected to be promoted to Triple-A Syracuse today. Drew Storen was promoted to Syracuse last week. We can expect to see both of these players in the Major Leagues in about one month’s time.

First of all, I am sorry for my long absence between blog posts. Final exams and the Canadiens have consumed my time.

I was planning on writing a post about how the Nationals are riddled by minor injuries to Ryan Zimmerman, Willie Harris, and Ivan Rodriguez. Then, Brian Bruney came into the game against the Cubs in the bottom of the 9th inning and proceeded to walk the leadoff batter. The batter, by the way, was Alfonso Soriano, he of the .326 career on-base percentage. Few things in baseball aggravate me more than a leadoff walk by the pitcher.

Bruney then faced Koyie Hill, who was pinch-hitting for Geovany Soto (a move which I don’t quite understand, even if Hill is a better bunter). Hill bunted into a fielder’s choice but was almost aided by Bruney’s throw which nearly sailed into center field (I am relying on Charlie and Dave’s description on the radio here).

So, naturally, Bruney is rewarded with a second inning of work. Keep in mind that Tyler Clippard, far and away the team’s best relief pitcher, has pitched one inning in three days. The tenth inning went like this: Ryan Theriot singles, Jeff Baker strikes out swinging, Derrek Lee walks on four pitches, and Marlon Byrd singles (on a pop-up between the right fielder and second baseman). That sequence of events set up a bases loaded, one out, bottom of the 10th inning situation in a tie game. Up to the plate stepped Aramis Ramirez, who, entering the game, was sporting a .220 wOBA. There is really only one option for the pitcher in this situation: throw strikes. Ramirez isn’t stupid enough to chase a pitch out of the zone, and a walk ends the game anyway. Predictably, Bruney threw four straight balls to end the game.

Quick digression: to be fair to Bruney, the last two pitches were very close and could have gone either way. The 2-0 was a fastball at the knees, and the 3-0 was a fastball at the belt. Either Greg Gibson had late dinner reservations or he didn’t think Bruney deserved a close call. Both options seem viable.

Bruney has made 10 appearances and has given up a run in four of them. This is not a terrible percentage. However, Bruney’s WPA now stands at -0.319. Maybe relievers get the raw end of the deal because when they pitch well, their WPA does not increase much, but if they give up the lead, their WPA takes a big hit. My biggest issue with Bruney, though, is that he has walked 11 batters in 9 2/3 innings. Sadly, this is not a new establishment. In his career, he has walked 6.3 batters per nine innings. His strikeout to walk ratio is a meager 1.38.

Brian Bruney stinks, and it is about time that Mike Rizzo realizes that. If the Nationals are going to put crap on the field, at least put out crap that hasn’t proven itself to be unworthy of a major league job.

Ok, fine, I am exaggerating a little bit.

Livan has made two starts this year.

April 11 @ NYM: 7.0 innings, 5 hits, 3 bb, 1 so, 88 pitches
April 17 vs. MIL: 9.0 innings, 4 hits, 2 bb, 3 so, 112 pitches

He won both, and here is why: the Nationals gave him an early lead, and Livan proceeded to pound the strike zone. Of the 200 pitches he has thrown, 121 of them have been strikes. The best way to describe Hernandez is efficient. However, another way to describe him is smart. When given a lead, a pitcher shouldn’t go out there looking for strike outs or nibbling around hitters. Livan understands this. If he gives up a home run to Ryan Braun, so what? He faces him once or twice more in the game. Braun and Fielder themselves can’t make up 8 runs.

Typically, the two starts Livan had would be cause for concern. He doesn’t induce many swings and misses (3 in his first start), and he doesn’t strike many batters out. This should come back and even out over the course of the year, and that is very disconcerting. That being said, Livan has yet to allow a home run, suggesting that batters are having a hard time squaring up on the ball.

The other pitchers on the team could learn a thing or two from Livan. When given a big lead, don’t be afraid to challenge the hitters. And if you do give up a home run, don’t worry about it. Move on to the next batter. The other pitchers – John Lannan included, who claims to good at dealing with adversity – never seem to be able to bounce back from a hit. Well, they have to learn. If nothing else, just look at the results produced by Livan. 16 innings, 0 runs, 2 wins.

There are two other very interesting and important statistics to note about these two starts. The first is that Livan had a WPA of .198 in his first start and .293 in today’s start. In other words, all by himself, he increased the Nationals’ odds of winning the game by 20% and 30% in his respective starts. That is impressive. The second number is Leverage Index. In each start, Livan’s average LI while pitching have been 0.60 and 0.62. That is low. In fact, that is extremely low. Granted, when pitching with an 8-run lead, LI will be low inherently. However, Livan did a good job of keeping runners off base, keeping his LI low. In doing so, he threw fewer high-stress pitches, allowing him to remain in the game longer. As a result, the usually self-imploding bullpen was given the entire day off, meaning the good pitchers will be rested for tomorrow and the bad pitches can take the weekend off.

Livan came into Spring Training as a non-roster invitee and, 11 games into the season, is far and away the Nationals’ best pitcher.

Closers are over rated, but no one likes to challenge conventional thinking nowadays (save John Russell; see: Pitcher batting 8th). Specifically, every team has one setup man and one closer, as well as a hierarchy of relievers to pitch the 6th and 7th innings when the team is winning and losing.

Scrap it! Here’s what teams should do: match up the best reliever on the team with the other team’s best hitters. For the Nationals a guy like Tyler Clippard can pitch two innings on two consecutive days. Instead of making him pitch the 6th and 7th, why not just match him up with the Utley, Howard, and Werth part of the Phillies’ line up, whatever inning that may be?

This may be a problem with some relievers, namely closers, who are creatures of habit. They have a clearly defined role. They know when they will and will not pitch based on the game situation. Well, I say, [bleep] ‘em. What’s the value of a guy who can pitch one inning only when the team is winning in the game’s potential last inning? A guy like Matt Capps would have more value, anyway, if he could pitch well in any situation. Any reliever would.

This has turned into a bit of a rant because I am mad at the Nationals’ bullpen. Collectively, it sucks talent-wise. However, the two bright-ish spots are Clippard and Sean Burnett. I am not sure why, whenever they are available to pitch, these guys are not the first options to face the opposing team’s best hitters.

The other thing that has me upset is the save. What a stupid statistic. Saves, blown saves, holds, etc. These were created just as a ploy to make some pitchers more money. But the pitchers who get their teams from the starting pitcher to the closer unscathed do not get nearly as much notoriety (holds have much lower standing than saves). Plus, it is completely circumstantial. Clippard could be a successful closer. He could be piling up the saves and would be making many millions of dollars instead of Capps.

Under my model for bullpens (which isn’t exactly new), two statistics are very important: Leverage Index (LI) and Win Probability Added (WPA). Leverage Index measures the importance of any given situation depending on a variety of factors. Win Probability Added measures the difference of how much a player added to a team’s probability of winning and how much that player takes away over the course of the year.

Using a team’s best relief pitcher at the most important times of the game will be reflected by LI, and how successful the pitcher is will be reflected by WPA as well as our good, ole’ friend, xFIP.

I ran this idea by one of my always argumentative friends. He told me to consider the “human element,” that pitchers cannot pitch every day and are better on a schedule or defined role. To address the first point, I don’t expect the pitcher to pitch every day, but he should be able to maintain the same level of readiness as in the current bullpen setup. Any given relief pitcher cannot pitch every day as is anyway. The other issue is ridiculous. If a pitcher wants a defined role, he can sell insurance. He knows what he will do every day. Baseball is a game of variability every day, so no pitcher should reasonably expect to pitch in only one type of situation.

Instead of considering this a “closer by committee” bullpen, consider it a “maximizing the use of your best relief pitchers” bullpen. A manager has plenty of time to figure out in which innings an opposing team’s sluggers are going to hit, and, as such, he should easily be able to send out his best relief pitcher to face these hitters.

It’s not a radical idea; it’s just different.